Nomadic violence in the first Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and the military orders by Schenk, Jochen G.
Nomadic violence in the first Latin 
kingdom of Jerusalem and the military 
orders 
Article 
Published Version 
Schenk, J. G. (2010) Nomadic violence in the first Latin 
kingdom of Jerusalem and the military orders. Reading 
Medieval Studies, XXXVI. pp. 39­55. ISSN 0950­3129 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/84229/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Publisher: University of Reading 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Nomadic Violence in the First Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and 
the Military Orders 
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39 
This present study takes its inspiration from Ronnie Ellenblum's revisipnist book on 
crusader casdes, Crusader Castles and Modern Histones. ' In the book Ellenblum not 
only challenges prevailing ideas of the socio-political functions and implications of the 
medieval casde. Relying a great deal on Raymond Smail he also develops the view 
that casdes marked the centres of the lordships dependent on them, that the size and 
shape of lordships were deterntined by the power radiating from these casdes and 
that borders existed where such power ceased to be effective,' Moreover. in his 
previous sludy on patterns of Frankish settlement in the Latin East Ellenblum has 
described the unevenness ofruraJ settlements in the Crusader kingdom of jerusalem, 
a kingdom that was divided by cultural borders dating back to Byzantine and Biblical 
times. It was along the lines of a cultural frontier and along religious divisions, which 
had segregated, for example, the Samaritan population from the Byzantine Christians 
in Central Samaria, that the rural settlement of the Franks developed, creating wide 
spaces where Frankish settlers never gained a foot and where nomadic tribesmen 
('wandering Turks' as well as Bedouins) made up a large percentage of the 
population.! These were also the regions where the military orders of the Temple 
and the Hospital established some of their major strongholds during the second half 
of the twelfth century. This study argues that in addition to protecting the kingdom of 
Jerusalem against perceived enemies from without, these strongholds are evidence of 
the military orders' involvement in policing nomads roaming within and traversing 
through the kingdom. 
A second outcome of Ellenblum's more recent research is his concept of 
'geography of fear'. ' It correlates the degree of actual threat, measured by the number 
of reported attacks on the kingdom, with the activity of casde building over a 
prolonged period of time. The way he sees it, after 1099 the kingdom did not endure 
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in a perpetual state of emergency. as the chroniclers and many historians wdIlted us to 
believe. Rather, the roughly ninety years leading to Saladin's decisive victory over the 
Frankish army at Battin in 1187, which put an end to the fIrst Frankish kingdom, can 
be divided into a period of frequent military engagement between Franks and 
Muslims, a period of relative security, and a period of sustained Muslim offensive, 
which resulted in the creation of the Frankish frontier. The first of these periods, 
which lasted from 1099 until 1115, was defmed by the frequent incursions of Fatimid 
armies from the south and Seldjuk armies from the east into the kingdom of 
Jerusalem. The second, lasting from 1115 until 1167, witnessed a sharp decline in the 
number of orchestrated Muslim attacks and an increase in Frankish offensive 
campaigns, which coincided with the establishment and fe-enforcement of numerous 
fortresses, particularly in the south-western part of the kingdom. The third period, 
which lasted until 1187. saw the crusader states put under increasing pressure [rom a 
united Muslim enemy under the charismatic leadership ofNur ad-Din and Saladin.' 
The dates for each period can be debated and would have diff~red from region 
to region, but the chronology, even in its narrowest tenns, suggests that the Order of 
the Temple was founded, and the Order of Stjohn became military, in the second 
period, and thus at a rime of relative peace and security (the frequency of Muslim 
attacks during that period was approximately twelve times less than during the first 
stage, from 1099 to 1115).' The creation of the Order of the Temple in 1120 
happened more than a decade after the last Fatimid attack from Ascalon on 
Jerusalem and seven years after the last reported attafk by the joint armies of 
Damascus and Mosul from Damascus. 7 What the [oooding brothers of the Order of 
the Temple would have been experiencing was, in relative tenns, a period of peace 
and Frankish expansion. Similarly, King Fulk's transfer of the castle Bethgibehn to 
the Order of St John in 1136, which is the earliest evidence we have for the 
militarization of the Order, occurred at a time when the large~scale Fatimid intrusions 
into the kingdom orchestrated by, and channelled through, nearby Ascalon had 
already decreased significantly (although Ascalon was stili, correctly, perceived as a 
threat).' 
The creation of the military orders was therefore also a response to a different 
kind of immediate threat, onc that grew from 'within the newly created crusader states, 
albeit often with the support of, or inOuenced by, Aleppo, Damascus or Cairo. In the 
case of the Templars it is well documented that an important element of that 
perceived threat was the danger created by roaming bands of highwaymen, who 
preyed on pilgrims and other travellers using the old pilgIim roads. The road leading 
east from Acre to Rama was, according to the eleventh-century Persian traveller Nasir 
Kushraw, beleaguered by 'disorderly men, who set upon anyone whom they saw to 
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be a stranger in order to rob him of everything that he had. 'P The same was true for a 
stretch of the road leading from Rames to Jerusalem, where travellers suffered from 
the attacks of nearby villagers who were eventually smoked out of their mountain 
hideouts and killed by Baldwin of Edessa." The pilgrim Saewulf, who toured the 
Holy Land in 1102-3, and Abbot Daniel, travelling the region three years later, were 
shocked by the violence conducted by brigands to which travellers on the roads from 
JalTa to Jerusalem and from Jerusalem to the river Jordan, to Hebron, into Galilee, 
and in Baysan were exposed, with much of the blame being directed against 
'Saracens' from Ascalon. The situation had not improved when Abbot Ekkehard of 
Aura was touring the Holy Land sometime between 1110 and 1115," and, judging 
from other accounts, visitors to Bethlehem and travellers in Galilee did not fare much 
better. I i Bedouin violence in particular was also endemic in the Sinai desert, along 
major Muslim pilgrim routes to Mecca, and had by the eleventh century spread into 
Egypt I I 
In the kingdom of Jerusalem, it is difficult to discern who the perpetrators were 
who caused travellers, and eventually the Frankish government, such trouble. The 
sources mention 'Turh' or 'Turcomans', 'Saracens' and 'Bedouins'. Since the 
second century the lenn 'Saracen' (Saracenu~ was used as a synonym for the 
Bedouin Arab, including Arabian tribesmen who by the eleventh century had settled 
in Palestine and Syria. I' 'Turk' and 'Turcoman' would refer to oibesmen from the 
Seljuq empire who were again pouring into Northern Syria and Palestine from Persia 
in the eleventh century. Roaming freely around the counUyside they were, to quote 
Carole Hillenbrand, 'something of a loose canon'; unreliable, war prone, and loyal 
only to their own tribe. U The tenn 'Bedouin', would refer to Arabic-speaking pastoral 
nomads in general, Christians as well as Muslims, who inhabited the deserts to the 
east and south of the Latin kingdom." Among the tribes who had migrated to 
Palestine and Syria since the sixth century and who were still present in the Latin 
kingdom at the time of the crusades were the Banli Kilab in northern Syria, the Banli 
Tayy in southern Syria and the Banli Kalb in central Syria (around Damascus)." 
As recendy as 1993 the French geographer and historian Xavier de Planhol 
described the 'population bedouine' as 'fondamentalement agressive' and concluded 
that 'les nomades constituent une immense force de frappe potentielle pour qui saura 
Ies grouper eLles discipliner.' la But the terms Bedouin, Saracen and Turk were (and 
are) easily mixed up. Syriac writers customarily descJibed Saracen rulers as Bedouins, 
and EIlenblum has proposed the possibility that local Christians in general may have 
'regarded the Muslim occupation as equivalent to a nomadic incursionJ. I~ The 
anonymous author of the Tractatus de lods et statu sancta. terre ierosolimitane, 
writing in 1168-87, and the anonymous author of the His/ona Peregrinorum, 
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recalling an event that occurred on 25 April 1190, both mention 'Bedouin' 
marauders who were commonly known as 'free-roaming' or 'wild' Turks (silvestres 
TurCl~ agrestes TUfa), and who in the case of the Histona Peregrinorum seem to 
have been Turcoman tribesmen living in the mountains of Anatolia.1Il Possessing 
neither homeland nor home and forever liying together in campsites in tents made of 
hides, the 'Bedouins' sought permission to graze their animals from Christians and 
Saracens alike. In the eyes of the author of me Tracta[us they were traitors 
(prodJiores maximJ) and thieves (/atrones insigneSi since they acted as friends and 
brothers of the Christians one day, helping them to fight the Saracens, but aided the 
Saracens the next if it seemed oppomme to them, selling captured Christians to the 
Saracens and Muslim captives to the Christians as they saw fit 21 The author of the 
His/ona Peregrinorum recalled that 'Bedouins' (or 'wild Turks') descended 'in 
hordes' from the mountains when the army of Frederic Barbarossa entered Anatolia. 
'IAjlways in arms and willing and ready to fight' , they were brave (or foolish) enough 
to provoke a professional Frankish army.u Writing in the 1280s; the Dominican 
Bourchard of MOUnL Sion made the distinction belween the 'Saracens', whom he 
remembered as sinful yet hospitable. courteous and kind, and the 'Medianites, who 
are now called "Bedouins" or "Turcoman"'. They were herdsmen with no fixed 
dwellings and, in Bourchard's memory, 'exceedingly warlike'. 2S The important 
distinction made here is between a friendly sedentary population (Saracens) within 
the kingdom of Jerusalem and a war prone nomad one ffurcoman nomads and 
Bedouins). William of Tyrc, however, writing a century _before Bourchard, singled 
out the 'Saracens' within the borders as having posed the greatest threat to the 
nascent crusader kingdom, but he seems to have used the lenn as a general 
denominator. Recalling the first year of the kingdom he informs the reader: 
The cities which had come under our power were but few, and these 
were so situated in the midst of the enemy that the Christians could not 
pass from one to another. when necessity required. without great danger. 
The entire couno-y surrounding their possessions was inhabited by 
infidel Saracens, who were most cruel enemies of our people. These 
were all the more dangerous because they were close at hand, for no pest 
can more effectively do harm than an enemy at one's very doors. Any 
Christian who walked along the highway without taking due precaution 
was liable to be killed by the Saracens, or seized and handed over as a 
slave to the enemy. Moreover, they refused to cultivate the fields, in 
order that our people might suffer from hunger. In fact, they preferred to 
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endure famine themselves rather than furnish anydring to the Christians, 
whom they looked upon as enemies. 'U 
The research undertaken by Ellenblum in particular has helped a great deal to 
clarify the rather bleak picture described by William of Tyre. ti But one should note 
that the 'enemy at the door' to which William was referring was not lurking in Cairo 
or Damascus. The threat was created by Muslims within the realm whom William, 
writing with hindsight, suspected of collaboration with the enemy outside. The danger 
they posed was twofold. On the one hand, and this accusation would have been 
directed against the sedentary population, they were capable of putting the economic 
survival of the Frankish lords at risk by refusing to produce their crops. On the other, 
and this would have applied to the nomadic population, they were prone to thievery 
and murder and therefore posed an imminent physical threat to the Christians.:16 To 
continue with William, 
Nor was it on the highways alone that danger was feared. Even within the 
city walls, in the very houses, there was scarcely a place where one could 
rest in security. For Lhe inhabitants were few and scattered, and the 
ruinous state of the walls left every place exposed to the enemy. Thieves 
made stealthy inroads by night They broke into the deserted cities, 
whose few inhabitants were scattered apart, and overpowered many in 
their own houses. t1 
William of Tyre does not specify the identity or origin of these marauders but 
considering the long history of alleged Bedouin violence in Syria it is reasonable to 
assume that they may have included Bedouins from the old Arab tribes who were 
reported to have harassed the population of Rome's Syrian provinces in the sixth 
century, who had swept in waves over Syria during the early Islamic conquest and 
again in the tenth and early thirteenth centuries -- penetrating deep into the 
countryside, devastating large parts of southern Syria and dominating northern Syria 
in the late tenth and eleventh century - and of whom some had stayed behind, 
merged with the local tribes and established themselves in the hills and mountains of 
Syria, whence they were accused of habitually harassing travellers on nearby roads. · 
That the threat posed by bands of marauders was taken seriously by the early 
crusader settlers can be seen by some of the barons' brutal reactions to it. Baldwin of 
Edessa smoked hundreds of suspected robbers out of their mountain caves near the 
Jaffa-Jerusalem road, and in 1139 Thierry of Flanders, taking the army of Jerusalem 
with him, successfully besieged the most notorious of the fortified castles in the 
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mountains of Gilead, which was used by bandits as a rallying point for raids into the 
plains oOudea and Transjordan.· 
The areas of Nazareth and Baysan were described as two particularly lawless 
regions by Abbot Daniel, who visited both places in the early years of the twelfth 
century.XI But the lawlessness he describes was indicative of a larger problem, which 
affected the fonner Roman province of Samaria, north of Jerusalem, in which the 
town of Baysan was situated, and the eastern part of Galilee on which the town of 
Nazareth bordered. Ellenblum's own archaeological survey of the Latin Kingdom 
illustrates that throughout the crusader period Eastern Galilee was almost completely 
void of Frankish rural sites and no attempts seem to have been made by the Frankish 
regime to collect tithes or conduct other administrative activities in this region.31 
Violent resistance against foreign government had a long tradition in particular in the 
region around Baniyas, which llllder Byzantine rule had developed into a hotbed of 
Jihad activity. Holy warriors were recruited partly from among the refugees who had 
ned the cities conquered by Byzantium-and partly among Arab Bedduin tribes, who, 
attracted by the promise of pillage and by jihadist ideologues, would often travel long 
distances to partake in raiding campaigns against Byzantium, thus provoking 
Constlntinople to retaliate brutally.' 
According to EIlenblum, it was not only Latins, but Jews and Muslims living in 
Eastern Galilee who could be 'harassed by nomads and criminal elements'." Nomads 
in general and Bedouins in particular made up a large proportion of the population. 
They were particularly numerous in the Golan, the Hawran and the Jordan valley, 
and thus in areas from which much of the violence in Eastern Galilee spread. 
William ofTyre, reporting on the construction of the fortress of Va dum Jacob on the 
eastern fringe of Galilee in 1178, relates how even then bands of robbers (JalIuncuh) 
occupied villages and were terrorizing the inhabitants of Eastern Galilee without any 
notable interference. Eventually their holdout at modem Peqi'in was overthrown by 
King Baldwin, although a large number of robbers allegedly managed to escape to 
Damascus whence they continued their attacks. Sol 
If a seigniorial government existed in Eastern Galilee at the time but was too 
weak. to subjugate the robbers and suppress the violence relying on its own resources, 
this may help to explain why the castle of Vadum Jacob, built on the request of the 
Templars, was deemed necessary." The district of Na7AlJ'eth, which lay at the 
northern fringe of Eastern Galilee, would have faced many of the same problems 
caused by a largely nomadic population under weak governmental oversight. 
The case for Baysan in Central Samaria seems to have been similar. Sitllated in 
a region that had violently resisted Byzantine settlemen~ Baysan, which Tancred had 
occupied in 1099 and which fell to Saladin in 1183, was the ortly mixed community 
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in a twenty-kilometres radius of land that the Byzantine repression of previous revolts 
had otherwise lert 'almost totally deserted'.~ The plains of Baysan provided excellent 
pastures for Bedouins who would enter the kingdom in large numbers to graze their 
animals. Albert of Aachen, who once was considered a poor source but now is 
thought to have relied on the eyewitness testimony of returning crusaders, reports that 
in spring 1119, 
... certain Saracens from the realm of Arabia, and certain people of the race 
of the Idumei, whom people nowadays call Bedouins, were leading out of 
their land and region herds of camels, over thirty thousand, ten thousand 
oxen, flocks of sheep, and countless thousands of goats, and driving them 
to the pastures on the flanks of the realm of Damascus, where they 
attacked the ample grass by pennission and consent of the prince of the 
land of Damascus, in return for an agreed sum of bezants which the lord 
of the land himself was going to receive from them. With so many 
thousands of beast, over four thousand cavalry and infantry went along to 
guard the herds, from the lands of Egypt, Arabia, and the Bedouins, taking 
bow and quiver, lance and sword, and a great abundance of food supplies.37 
According to Albert, attracted by the abundance of spoil a band of sixty 
Frankish infantrymen and hundred and sixty cavalry under th" conunand of Joscelin 
of Courtenay, lord of Tiberias, and William and Geoffrey of Bures, attacked the 
unassuming herdsmen but were soundly defeated by a much stronger Bedouin 
guard.» A Frankish retaliation army under the command of the king soon arrived to 
confront the Bedouins, but intimidated by the nearby presence of Damascus the king 
instead agreed to settle the issue with a payment of blood-money and a tIx from the 
Bedouins. 
The demand of blood-money and tIxes may serve as evidence for the king's 
royal authority over the Bedouins as his special subjects (on which more later). More 
than anything else, however, in this case it exemplified the power vacuum that existed 
in Eastern Galilee and Central Sanlaria at the time, as well as the amount of authority 
that Damascus still managed to hold in the region of Baniyas. The political sicuation 
not only encouraged Bedouin tribesmen eager to use the region's fertile pastures to 
rely on support from the rulers of Damascus (who, albeit suspicious of them, had a 
history of employing Bedouins and Turcomans for their causes);M it also may have 
tempted bands of brigands to terrorize the outskirts of Frankish towns with large 
Muslim populations such as Nablus.~ 
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The direct correlation between weak governance, an increasing nomadization 
(or Bedouinisation) of the population and brigandism, which has been pointed out by 
Ellenblum. is well proven, as is the correlation between internal political conflict and 
an increase in Bedouin violence.4' One consequence of the process of nomadization 
that most regions in the Near East underwent in the eleventh and twelfth centuriesd 
was that disputes swept easily across political boundaries, which made them difficult 
to solve with the rigid tools of Frankish government The Frankish laws were hardly 
suited to deal with a population of itinerant tribesmen, who, unlike sedentary 
peasants, entered and exited the spheres of authority of different political and 
ecclesiastical bodies, Muslim and Christian alike, at apparendy free will. 
Although their itinerant life rendered the nomads suspicious in the eyes of 
many Christian and Muslim rulers - the anonymous thirteenth century author of the 
Memon. Terre Sancte and Saladin were equally wary of the notorious disloyalty of 
Bedouin auxiliaries and their habit of salvaging from the defeat of others - it also 
made them potentially very valuable sources for infonnation and helpful allies.'-'l To 
keep them in check and in order to profit from their natural dependence on pastures 
the Bedouins were given special legal status in the kingdom of Jerusalem in that they 
were put under the special protection and jurisdiction of the king as the only legal 
body who could, in theory, exercise overall authority over them in all parts of the 
realm and to whom they paid tributes in return for grazing rights.· To facilitate the 
government of Bedouin tribes the royal administration made attempts to collect data 
on the names, sizes (measured in 'tents') and locations of ir)dividual tribes within the 
kingdom with the aim in view to create assessable fmancial values in fonn of taxes 
which could be transferred, bonght and sold. That the administration had some 
success in Lhis endeavour is obvious from the fact that in 1138 the canons of the Holy 
Sepulchre received the village of Thecuas with its land, peasants and the right to 
collect tribute from Bedouin tribes grazing their livestock there, and that some time 
before 1161 Queen Melisende enfeoffed the viscounts of Nablus with a Bedouin 
tribe consisting of 103 individually named and listed families (tents).· 
In practice, however, the Bedouins, much like the Turcomans,4Il remained 
almost impossible 1.0 control and were always likely to switch sides if the opportunity 
for more lucrative alliances presented themselves. Travelling in large treks guarded by 
anned warnors their numbers and aggressive nature marked them as potentially 
destabilizing factors wherever they went The Bedouins from the Banu Khalid and 
Banu Rabi'ah branches of the Tayy confederation who arrived at Baysan in 1119 to 
graze their animals may not have counted four thousand warn~rs, as Albert of 
Aachen would like us to believe, but they brought more than enough men·at·anns 
with them to defeat a high profile Frankish raiding party." Twelve years earlier King 
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Baldwin had to abandon his plan of a full-front assault with sixty knights on a 
merchant caravan from Egypt heading for Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Damascus for 
similar reasons.oI8 Baysan and the plains SlUTOunding it were too close to Damascus 
for the Frankish king to exercise his authority effectively. It was to Damascus that the 
Bedouins had paid tribute in exchange for gr.cing rights and it was the military might 
of Damascus that prevented the king and his army from retaliating against them. 
In the light of all this, the question arises how the experience of insecurity, or 
helplessness, that prevailed in some parts of the kingdom and that was stirred further 
by a high level of brigand activity in regions with hU'ge nomadic populations relates to 
the spread of the military orders in the kingdom before the rise of Saladin. 
The pressing problem to which the military orders presented a solution at the 
rime when the kingdom experienced only limited external threat was twofold. On the 
one hand increased efforts needed to be undertaken to secure pilgrim sites and major 
routes of communication and traffic from marauders; on the other a k y had to be 
found to deal with the more general - and underlying - problem of handling, 
controlling and monitoring the Bedouin tribes and other nomads who lived in the 
kingdom or were traversing through it. 
The frrst point is well researched. The Order of St John had its origin in a 
pilgrim hospital and, after the Templars had set the example, it seemed for a 
substantial fraction of the brothers like a logical step that the Order should add 
military service to its work for the frail and poor.· The Qrder of the Temple was 
founded later but for the explicit purpose to ease the plight of pilgrims by use of the 
sword. Very likely, its foundation was an immediate reaction to the major onslaught 
on a large pilgrim caravan near the river Jordan that had occurred at Easter 1119 and 
for which Albert of Aachen held Saracens from Tyre and Ascalon responsible. On 
that day, three hundred pilgrims had been killed and sixty captured. ' 
For a while the Templars seem to have organised their patrols of the pilgrim 
sites from Jerusalem, but within a few decades they and the Hospitallers had set up 
strongholds across the country. With the notable exception of Gaza, given to the 
Templars after its restoration by King Baldwin IV 1149-50 but before 1153, and 
Bethgibelin, built and given to the Hospitailers already in 1136, which both were 
intended to effectively stave off the Fatimid garrison of Ascalon, most military 
fortifications which the two military orders had created or taken over in the Latin 
kingdom before c.1168 fulfilled the double purpose of guarding a pilgrim site and 
protecting the road leading to, from or through it." Along the road to the River 
Jordan the Templars had manned strongholds at the red cistern (a location associated 
with the parable of the Good Samaritan)" and on Mount Qarantene, the site of 
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Christ's temptation in the wilderness.~ The fortified tower of BeitJubr at-Tahtani was 
another likely early Templar fortification along the road to the river Jordan,~ as was 
the small Templar stronghold on the river bank at the Place of Baptism itself." Near 
Emmaus, where Christ had appeared to two of his disciples, stood the Templar casde 
of Latrun (Toron des Chevaliers), which kept watch over the road from Jaffa to 
Jerusalem." Le SaJTran (Shafa 'Amr), which the Templars held since before 1172, 
allowed them to control the road from Nazareth to Acre and also to guard the 
birthplace of saints James and John." At Haifa they fortified St Margaret's Casde on 
Mount Cannel, thus offering protection to the visitors Lo the cave of the prophet 
Elijah, further down the mountain.· The Hospitallers held Belmont (Belveir) near 
Emmaus on the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem" and by 1168 had fortified Aqua Bella 
(Khirbat'Iqbala) on the same road opposite Ernmaus.ro 
Most of these early fortifications were firmly situated within the perceived 
borders of the kingdom of Jerusalem. But by 1170 the military orders in the kingdom 
of Jerusalem had started establishing TIew castles and towers in reSians that were at 
the fringes of Frankish authority, notably Eastern Galilee and the valley of the River 
Jordan, which were more than ever exposed to Muslim attacks since Niir ad-Din had 
taken Baniyas and destroyed the casde at Ch.teauneuf in 1164." Even the idea of a 
Hospitaller lordship in Upper Egypt had at one point been on the table. ~ 
There seem to be two reasons for this shift of emphasis from the centre to the 
periphery and they are not mutually exclusive. On the one-hand the military orders, 
like the Frankish barons, needed to react to the increasing military pressure exercised 
by Nfu al-Din and his allies on their defences; on the other, the orders were aware of 
the need to consolidate Frankish authority in regions where it had been lacking and 
where an uncontrolled influx of wandering tribesmen from neighbouring territories 
was most likely to create a melange of people living within the kingdom whose 
reaction to a new war could not be predicted. This W'dS a justified concern and one 
that was still voiced in the thirteenth century. According to the anonymous author of 
the Memona Terre Sancte the Bedouin and Turcomans on the borders of the 
kingdom, but not only they, would always support the strongest power in the region 
and would continue to be a threat to the kingdom unless they were guarded by a 
strong force, such as might be provided by a military order. A Still in 1157 the 
Hospitallers had recanted on their offer to help Humphrey of Toron fortify the city 
of Baniyas, widely regarded as the 'key to the kingdom of Jerusalem', against Muslim 
attack.s after such an attack had prompdy hit the Hospitallers' supply train when it was 
approaching the city. With many of the escorting knights and sergeants killed or 
imprisoned and all supplies los~ the Hospitallers retreated from Banyias, 'fearing the 
cost of similar incidents'." By 1172, however, they had fortified the casde of Belvoir 
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high above the Jordan Valley and overlooking the road from Tiberias to Baysan and 
tWO fords across the river south of the Sea of Galilee,1!.! whereas the Templars had 
established themselves at the castles of La Feve in the Jezreel valley and of Sarad in 
Eastern Galilee, where the influence of Damascus and Aleppo was still strong. 
According to the German pilgrim Theoderich, writing in 1172, Belvoir was built to 
defend the kingdom against the assaults of Nur al-Din and Sarad to check the 
incursions of the Turks; a similar purpose can be assumed for La Feve.66 Six years 
after Theoderich completed his travel account the Templars gained royal permission 
from Baldwin IV to build a further castle at the strategically important VadumJacob, 
which they completed within six months, fortified with a strong garrison, and stocked 
with weapons and supplies.61 
To consolidate Frankish authority effectively, these forward castles functioned 
as centres of a new administration that extended its power into the landscape and 
exerted its authority over the nomadic tribes by binding them to the land or the law. 
They were also effective insnuments to repel bands of bandits and m'l""arauders who, 
according to William of Tyre, were still roaming freely in the mountain ranges of 
Upper Galilee at that time.M Moreover, just like the castles and fortified towers built 
by the Romans six centuries earlier, castles like Safed allowed the occupant to watch 
tribal movements, dispatch patrols and skirmishers and provide guards for caravans 
and travellers if required.9 'The castles of the military orders were, in short, exactly 
what Raymond Smail believed crusader castles to be: economic administrative centres 
that allowed their owners or keepers to conn'ol and exploit the rural population, to 
police the surrounding landscape and to control nomadic tribes. 70 Just how efTectivly a 
castle could order a landscape is illustrated in the thirteenth-century description of the 
reconstruction of Castle Sarad by the Templars in 1240-1." 
Once completed the castle of Sarad controlled the whole of Galilee, 260 
villages in all, and provided protection for travellers and farmers between the Jordan 
and Acre. 711 It served as a basis for attacks launched against Damascus, but also as a 
deterrent against marauders, Turcomans as well as Bedouins, who terrorized the land 
between Acre and Damascus. The robbers mentioned in the description of Bishop 
Benedict's second visit to Safed were very likely the same as the nomadic bands of 
brigands who William of Tyre had described seventy years earlier as living 
undisturbed in the centre of Galilee. ~ With the re-construction of Safad their terror 
had abated. As a consequence many pilgrim sites in Eastern Galilee were again safely 
accessible for pilgrims, for example the cistern in which Joseph was thrown by his 
brothers; the city of Capemaum, home to the apostles Peter, Andrew, James and 
John; the mountain near Tiberias where Jesus had fed the masses; the place near the 
Sea of Galilee where Christ had revealed himself to his disciples; the place of the last 
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supper; and Magdala, birth place of Mary Magdalene." It is reasonable to believe that 
the threat that these bandit communities posed to villagers, travellers and pilgrim sites 
and which the Templars were able to deter with the reconstruction of the castle in the 
thirteenth century, was another motivation why the cascie of Safad needed to be built 
in the first place. 
The Hospitaller castle of Belvoir would have made a similar impression on the 
landscape. like Safad or Crac des Chevaliers in the county of Tripoli (which, 
according to Bourchard of Mont Sion, served as a deterrent to the Bedouins and 
Turcomans inhabiting the plains surround it) 1li Belvoir was most powerful as an 
instrument for governmental oversight. Moreover, it was an instrument to get a tighter 
grip on the Bedouins, who, if they were local tribes, had until then been living under 
royal and not a particular lordship's protection, but who were also roaming outside 
the perceived borders of the kingdom in great numbers. The right to charge them 
pasture taxes and annual fees if they crossed into Frankish territory was a lucrative 
fmancial asset which, however, also gave the recipient a duty to monitor them. The 
Templars and HospitalJers took on these responsibilities after 1160 and probably 
before. In November 1160 King Baldwin granted the Hospitallers legal possession 
over fifteen Bedouin households (referred to as 'tents') who had never belonged to 
rum and whom the Hospitaliers were free to draw from 'wherever they can.' These 
households, it was agreed, should 'serve the Hospital without hindrance'." In 1179 
the viscount of Nablus, whose lordship had suffered badly fmm nomad attacks, was 
able to sell the HospitalJers an entire tribe of Bedouins, consisting of 105 tents. One 
year later King Baldwin IV granted the Order the right to ;;'semble another hundred 
Bedouin households from outside the kingdom at Belvoir, thus empowering the 
Order to make the families accountable for their actions. n 
The large scale sale and transfer of Bedouin households into the control of the 
Hospitallers, aod doubtless also into that of the Templars, occurred at a time of 
heightened military activity between the kingdom of Jerusalem and its Muslim 
neighbours. All economic considerations aside, given the reputation the Bedouins 
enjoyed as perpetrators of violence and unrest these actions should also be regarded 
as precautionary measures to draw them into the sphere of influence of the military 
orders, who constituted the only institutions beside the king whose secular authority 
transgressed seigniarial boundaries and who could thus exercise conlTol over them 
effectively. This benefited the Order's primary task, which remained the protection of 
pilgrims, who in the past had suffered from nomadic violence. In so doing, but more 
so by establishing a network of strongholds along the roads and effecting 
governmental control in the periphery and among the ethnic and social groups most 
prone to seemingly erratic violence the Templars and the Hospitallers were essential 
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in creating and maintaining a level of stability within hitherto neglected parts of the 
kingdom that would ha-'e allowed other elements of statehood to emerge. In that the 
military orders, until the rise of Saladin, were not so much a product of the period of 
relative quietude and peace but important maintaining factors of it. 
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